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Human conduct is often guided by “conformist preferences”, which thrive on behavioral 
expectations within a society, with conformity being the act of changing one’s behavior to match 
the purported beliefs of others. Despite a growing research line considering preferences for a fair 
outcome allocation, economic theories do not explain the fundamental conditions for some social 
norm – whether of fairness or not – to be followed. Inspired by Bicchieri’s account of norms 
(C.Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society. CambridgeUP [2006]),  I develop a behavioral theory of 
norm conformity building on the Battigalli-Dufwenberg “psychological” framework (P.Battigalli 
and M.Dufwenberg, Dynamic Psychological Games, J.Econ.Theory, 144:1-35 [2009]). 
KEYWORDS: conformist preferences, social norms, social dilemmas, psychological game theory, 
behavioral economics. 
 
I. Introduction 
Socio-economic behavior is generally modelled on rational choice theory’s 
prescriptions: economic theory assumes that an agent has preferences 
satisfying some rationality requirements, yet most traditional economic 
applications simply view those requirements as implying that the self-interest 
of the agent is narrowly self-centred and unaffected by the others’ outcome. 
On the other hand, the widely documented regularities of behavior 
inconsistent with the standard predictions of models with rational self-centred 
individuals have motivated alternative accounts. Everyday life examples of 
such “incidents” might be brought about by norms that informally prescribe 
how people ought to behave in the community or workplace, and which are 
enforced out of fear of social sanctions: Arrow’s [1972] pioneering 
                                  
1
 I am grateful to Cristina Bicchieri, Dirk Engelmann, David Rojo-Arjona, and Robert Sugden for 
their helpful comments. All errors are mine. 
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investigation suggests that entrepreneurs, who could turn a profit on hiring 
labour cheaply from a racially discriminated group, were restrained from 
doing so owing to the establishment of social customs involving 
discriminatory tastes; or rather, as Akerlof [1980] claims, if the custom 
prohibits an employer from hiring labour at a reduced wage, employees will 
not cooperate in training new workers who undercut existing wages, because 
by doing so they would suffer a loss of reputation for participating in 
disobeying the norm. Other situations that are often explained by the 
enforcement of informal norms regulating social behavior include the 
voluntary supply of public goods (Sugden [1984]) and altruistic or reciprocity-
based transactions such as gift-giving, etc. (Sacco et al. [2006]). 
The above instances seem to be validated by a wealth of experimental 
evidence in mixed-motive (i.e.: social dilemma) games, which provide support 
against the traditional self-centred view of economic agents (Camerer [2003], 
Ch. 2, Fehr and Schmidt [2006], Ledyard [1995]). In this regard, the present 
investigation contributes to the existing explanatory literature by focusing on a 
conditional motivation that can make people comply with default rules of 
behavior in social dilemmas. In a nutshell, this essay suggests that many 
individuals have a tendency to follow the behavior, attitudes or judgements of 
others, with the others’ observed or purported behavior being considered 
appropriate or normal (within a certain social group): here a “behavioral rule” 
capturing some appropriate behavior is formally defined as a correspondence 
that dictates a set of strategy profiles at each node of an extensive form game; 
under precisely stated conditions it is assumed that conformity is generated by 
the anticipation of some negative emotion, which would arise in the event of 
violations of the relevant rule. The conditions for a “social norm” to be 
followed by a certain population will be defined regardless of either the 
specifics or the intrinsic value of the behavioral rule; in other words, the 
conditions to be introduced in this paper shall apply to any rule of behavior 
that may be collectively adopted by a social group, thereby coming to 
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constitute a social norm (e.g.: norms of equality, reciprocity, revenge, 
efficiency, etc.).   
It should be noted that relatively recent developments in behavioral 
game theory have substantially improved the analysis of strategic interaction 
by allowing for diverse assumptions about players’ emotions and preferences. 
Some of the social preference theories, namely the so-called models of 
“reciprocal fairness”, seem to be most effective in accounting for other-
regarding behavior where intentions matter: think of Rabin [1993], 
Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger [2004], Falk-Fischbacher [2006], Charness-Rabin 
[2002]. All such psychological game theory models assume that players have a 
preference for a somehow specified equitable payoff (Rabin [1993], 
Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger [2004]) or they are intention-based inequity averse 
(Falk-Fischbacher [2006]
2
) or they have a taste for both fairness and efficiency 
(captured by quasi-maximin preferences in Charness-Rabin [2002]); so, the 
aforementioned models may be interpreted as more or less implicitly assuming 
that players have internalized a variously defined, unique norm of fairness or 
reciprocity. Now, while each of those models can explain a substantial part of 
the experimental results on other-regarding behavior, by assuming a stable 
disposition towards some pre-defined notion of fairness any one model cannot 
generally explain the fact that different individuals are often motivated by 
different forms of (possibly culture-dependent) other-regarding principles 
(Henrich et al. [2001], Fischbacher and Gächter [2010]); also, the above 
models cannot generally account for an individual having a preference for a 
                                  
2
 Falk and Fischbacher [2006] define “kindness” directly in relation to the payoff that the co-player 
gets: their model can therefore be viewed as an intention-based inequity aversion theory (as 
opposed to a simple inequity aversion theory à la Fehr and Schmidt [1999] or Bolton and 
Ockenfels [2000]). 
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certain outcome, conditional on the fact that she expects others not to deviate 
from the precepts of the relevant rule of behavior (e.g.: people often dislike 
vandalism or littering, although they are likely to indulge in misbehavior 
whenever evidence of vandalism or littering is present in the environment). 
Similarly, the aforementioned models are typically vulnerable to changes in 
the framing of games which, as it will be clear, affects the players’ behavioral 
expectations: for example, it has been observed that subjects’ altruistic 
behavior often varies with contextual factors involving the extent to which 
some subject   knows that her counterpart   is aware that   is responsible for 
some “inappropriate” behavior (in this respect, Dana et al. [2007] show that 
relaxing the players’ common knowledge of a one-to-one mapping between 
actions and outcomes in Dictator Game experiments gives subjects the moral 
“wiggle room” to behave selfishly).  
Now, surveys from various disciplines – including neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology – support the view that human conduct is often guided 
by conformist preferences (Klucharev et al. [2009], Montague and Lohrenz 
[2007]) which thrive on behavioral expectations within a society or group, 
with conformity being the act of changing one’s behavior to match the 
purported beliefs of others (Cialdini and Goldstein [2004]). To that end, the 
present essay takes the investigation of other-regarding preferences in mixed-
motive games one step further: despite a growing body of literature 
considering preferences for a fair outcome allocation among players, 
economic theories do not explain the fundamental conditions for some social 
norm (whether of fairness or not) to exist and to be in operation among players 
with conformist motivations. Therefore, inspired by Cristina Bicchieri’s 
[2006] philosophical account of norms, here I develop an original behavioral 
theory of conditionally conformist preferences in social dilemmas, building on 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s [2009] framework for the analysis of dynamic 
psychological games. To sum up, in what follows: I define a behavioral rule 
as a correspondence dictating the strategy profiles most “appropriate” 
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(according to some principle); I assume that conformist players, at each 
decision node, hold a conjecture about the active player’s rule-complying 
actions available at that node; I then model the expected utility function of a 
conformist player as a linear combination of her material payoff and a 
psychological component representing a negative emotion arising from 
presumed norm violations. A social norm is said to exist and to be followed by 
a population whenever players maximize their expected utilities, given their 
correct beliefs and their conformist preferences being conditional on the 
following elements: i. they are aware of the existence of some rule of 
behavior; ii. they believe that the others will behave in keeping with some 
rule; iii. they believe that the others expect them to behave in keeping with 
some rule, and the cost of a potential violation is sufficiently high to make it 
unprofitable.
3
  
The remainder of the essay is organized in this manner: II introduces 
some general notation on extensive form games and conditional systems of 
beliefs; III formally lays out the model; IV discusses an equilibrium solution; 
V provides some applications, and VI concludes. 
II. Preliminaries 
1. Notation on extensive form games 
An extensive form game (with perfect recall) is given by the structure 
〈      (I )   〉, where:   *     + is the set of players, H is the finite set 
of feasible histories, P is the player function, I  is the information partition of 
                                  
3
 The conditions are derived from Bicchieri’s [2006] pioneering account, although their formal 
implementation will introduce a number of advances on Bicchieri’s framework, since here the 
players’ utility function will directly reflect a mathematically-precise specification of the very 
conditions: a “psychological” utility function and the use of extensive form games with updating of 
beliefs will result in increased predictive power. 
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Player  . Each element of   is a history, which is a (finite) sequence of actions 
taken by the players: let  (  ) denote a sequence (       ), with    being 
the  -th action chosen along the game tree.4 Further, let   denote the set of 
terminal histories, with     being the set of non-terminal histories; given 
that, let   ( ) denote the set of feasible actions for Player   at history  . 
The player function   assigns to each element of     an element of  , 
with  ( ) being the player choosing an action after the history  . Then, for 
each player    , I  denotes the information partition of Player   – and    I  
is an information set of Player   – where a partition I  of    *      ( )  
 + has the property that  ( )   (  ) if   and    are in the same cell of the 
partition. The material payoffs of players’ strategies are described by functions 
        for each player    . Further, for each player     let    denote 
the set of pure strategies of Player  : hence,    (    )      is a strategy for 
Player  , that is, a plan specifying the action chosen at every history after 
which Player   moves (with      being the action implemented by    if history 
  occurred). A strategy profile   is a tuple of strategies, with one strategy for 
each player of the game: let   ∏       be the set of strategy profiles; 
similarly define     ∏       for players   other than  . Finally denote the set 
of Player  ’s pure strategies allowing history   (i.e.: strategies leading to, and 
succeeding,  ) as   ( ); strategy profiles allowing history   are defined as 
 ( )  ∏   ( )   , and    ( )  ∏   ( )    for all players   other than  . 
With a slight abuse of notation, let  ( ) indicate a terminal history induced by 
some strategy profile    .  
                                  
4
 Notice that, in what follows, a node of the game tree is identified with the history leading up to it 
(i.e.: a path in the game tree) as in Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]. 
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2. Conditional systems of beliefs 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2009] provide a framework for the analysis of 
dynamic psychological games, where conditional higher-order systems of 
beliefs influence the players’ motivation. As in their model, here behavioral 
strategies are used to describe Player  ’s beliefs about Player  ’s actions at 
each history after which   has to play: formally, a behavioral strategy of 
Player   is a collection of independent probability measures    
(  ( | ))      
∏  (  ( ))     , where   ( | ) is the probability of action 
  at history   and  (  ( )) denotes the set of probability measures over the 
set of Player  ’s feasible actions at history  . Then,     ( | ̂)   .  ( ̂)/ is 
the probability measure over Player  ’s strategies, conditional on  ̂, derived 
from    and therefore, for some pure strategy      ( ̂), Pr  (  | ̂)
  ∏   (    | )          ̂  indicates the conditional probability of   , given that 
 ̂ has occurred (note that    ̂ is a history subsequent or equal to  ̂, and      
is the action selected by    if history   took place). 
Following Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s [2007] notation, every player 
    holds a system of first-order beliefs    (  ( | ))    
 about the 
strategies of all the co-players (e.g.: in a game with perfect information, at 
each      Player   holds an updated belief   ( | )   (   ( )) such that 
she believes that all players have chosen all the actions leading to   with 
probability 1). At each      Player   further holds a system of second-order 
beliefs    about the first-order belief system of each of the opponents: for 
simplicity, for some     ,   ( ) indicates a collection of  ’s point beliefs 
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about every  ’s first-order belief (i.e.:   ( ) denotes  ’s point belief about 
    .  ( | 
 )/
          
). Given that, for each    , let     
  ( )   (  ( )) 
denote Player  ’s strategy-part of .  ( | 
 )/
     
, which represents  ’s point 
belief about what some player     believes about  ’s strategies.5 Finally, it is 
assumed that players’ beliefs at different information sets must satisfy Bayes’ 
rule and common knowledge of Bayesian updating. 
III. A model of social norms 
1. Behavioral rules 
I can now turn to shape an original theory of conformity to social norms. In 
this sub-section a “behavioral rule” is defined as a correspondence that 
dictates a set of strategy profiles at each decision node of the game tree. For a 
given history/node, the dictated set of strategy profiles is intended as 
indicating behavior appropriate from that history onwards.
6
  
 
Definition 1. Given an extensive form game  , a behavioral rule is a set-
valued function   that assigns to every non-terminal history       one or 
more elements from the set  ( ) of strategy profiles allowing history  ; that 
is, a behavioral rule          is a correspondence dictating the strategy 
                                  
5
 Recalling that a behavioral strategy    is used to describe the other players’ beliefs about Player 
 ’s behavior, the reader can anticipate that (as it will be imposed later on) in equilibrium 
  (   | ̂)  ∏ Pr  (  | ̂)   . Besides, since in equilibrium    will be derived from the behavioral 
strategy profile   (  )   , every player     will hold the same beliefs about Player  ’s 
strategies, which implies that in equilibrium   
  ( )   (  ( )) represents Player  ’s beliefs about 
what every other player unanimously believes about  ’s strategies. 
6
 This implies that if the set of strategy profiles dictated by the behavioral rule at the initial history 
is singleton and if, along the play, no player ever deviates from such prescripts, then that rule will 
dictate exactly the same strategy profile at all successor nodes. 
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profiles most “appropriate” – according to a certain principle – for each node 
of the given (mixed-motive) game.  
 
Instances of such behavioral rules include instructions that prescribe behavior 
minimizing payoff-inequality among players, procedures that dictate behavior 
maximizing the players’ joint welfare, rules instructing players to reciprocate 
the preceding action, etc..
7
 For example, consider a rule that prescribes 
behavior minimizing payoff-inequality among players: when one evaluates 
such a rule at the root of a game tree, the rule will dictate those strategy 
profiles that minimize the difference in payoffs among players – at a given 
terminal node – considering that every terminal node can be reached. Now, 
assume that one of the players deviates along the play (by choosing an action 
that was not part of the set of strategy profiles dictated at the root); then, when 
evaluating this behavioral rule at a node following such a deviation, the rule 
will dictate strategy profiles that minimize the difference in payoffs among 
players, conditional on the terminal nodes that can still be reached.
8
  
Before I move on, it should be highlighted that a behavioral rule, as per 
definition 1, does not embody in itself an element of rationality. Further, it is 
assumed that all rules regulating social dilemmas are contained in a universal 
set of behavioral rules, while each player is only aware of the rules contained 
                                  
7
 For a few specific (formal) definitions of behavioral rules, see section V below. 
8
 Notice that the above definition of behavioral rule is different from the one suggested by López-
Pérez [2008], where a “norm” is defined as a correspondence mapping   into  ( ) for all    . In 
fact, here it is argued that defining a behavioral rule as a correspondence mapping non-terminal 
histories into strategy profiles allows to better capture the strategic complexity of many norm-
driven situations: note that the present definition is useful when considering games with both 
conditionally and unconditionally conformist players (since defining a rule in such a way allows to 
take into account the behavior of an unconditionally conformist player who gets to move after 
someone’s deviation). On a different note, disregarding the role of expectations in sustaining a 
social norm seems to be a conceptual drawback of López-Pérez’s model, although that certainly 
makes his framework parsimonious. 
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in her personal subset (as determined by a collection of attitudes, values, 
goals, and practices characterizing her group, organization or institution); thus, 
denote by   the set of behavioral rules, and for each     let    be the 
behavioral rule subset of Player  , with     . To sum up, the interpretation 
is as follows: given a universal set of rules  , the culture of each player   
marks out a subset   , stored in  ’s memory, which contains default rules of 
behavior in accordance with set usage, procedure, discipline or principle she is 
aware of. It is assumed that each player’s rule subset may contain all or just 
part of the rules of the other players’ subsets – depending on the extent to 
which players share the same culture – or may even be empty. 
Now, given an extensive form game   and some behavioral rule  ̇, 
with  ̇   , let  ̇(  ) denote the set of strategy profiles that that rule dictates at 
the initial history, henceforth referred to as the set of strategy profiles 
completely consistent with  ̇.9 Further, given a rule subset      for each 
   , denote by   ( ) the set of rule-complying strategy profiles allowing 
history  , which is defined as   ( )  *   ( )                ( )+: in 
other words,   ( ) is the set of strategy profiles consistent with any      
that is evaluated at a certain history/node  . Given that, let     .  ( ̂)/ 
denote the set of Player  ’s rule-complying actions at history  , which depicts 
the set of actions prescribed (by any     ) to Player   at history    ̂; so, if 
Player   – once at history   – takes an action being part of the rule-complying 
strategy profiles allowing  ̂, then          .  ( ̂)/. Finally, denote the set of 
Player  ’s rule-complying strategies allowing history   as   (  ( )), which 
                                  
9
 The expression “completely consistent” alludes to the fact that at    the behavioral rule dictates a 
set of strategy profiles indicating behavior appropriate for the game as a whole. 
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represents  ’s strategy-part of the set of rule-complying strategy profiles 
allowing  .  
 
Figure 1 - Dynamic Prisoner’s Dilemma “DPS” 
 
Consider the above Dynamic Prisoner’s Dilemma and let   be an “efficiency 
rule”, defined as a behavioral rule dictating strategy profiles that, at each 
history/node, maximize the players’ joint welfare. It is clear that, in this case, 
the set of strategy profiles completely consistent with   is singleton, that is, 
 (  )  *(    )+; indeed, the strategy profile (    ) yields the payoff 
profile (   ), which maximizes the sum of the players’ payoffs. Now assume 
that, for whatever reason, Player 1 deviates from the precepts of the efficiency 
rule by choosing  ; thus, when evaluating the efficiency rule at  ( ), such a 
behavioral rule will still dictate a strategy profile that maximizes the players’ 
joint welfare, but conditional on the terminal nodes that can be reached now (it 
follows that here  ( ( ))  *(    )+, which yields the payoff profile (   )). 
Further, assuming that    contains only the efficiency rule, for      , one 
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can denote the set of Player 1’s rule-complying strategies allowing    as 
  (  ( 
 ))  * +. Similarly, for Player 2,   (  ( 
 ))  *  +; hence the sets 
of Player 2’s rule-complying actions at  ( ) and  ( ) can be expressed, 
respectively, as     ( )(  ( 
 ))  * + and     ( )(  ( 
 ))  * +.10 
2. Norm-conjectures 
It is assumed that conformist players, conditional on each history/node of an 
extensive form game, hold a conjecture about the active player’s rule-
complying actions at that history. 
 
Definition 2. Given an extensive form game   and for each     a rule 
subset     , a norm-conjecture of Player   is a collection of independent 
probability measures    (  ( | ))      
∏  .  ( )( )/     , with 
  ( | ) being the probability of action   at history  , such that: 
supp    supp (  ( | ))      ∏   ( )  (  
(  ))
     
  
where supp    denotes the support of   , and   ( )  (  ( 
 )) is the set of rule-
complying actions of the player active at  , as dictated at    by any     .
11
 
 
In plain words, conditional on each       Player   holds a conjecture 
  ( | ) about the active player’s (rule-complying) actions at  . It should be 
                                  
10
 It should be noted that generally, in the event that       (for some      , with    ), the set 
of Player  ’s rule-complying strategies – according to  ’s rule subset      – may not be the same 
as the set of Player  ’s rule-complying strategies according to  ’s rule subset: in other terms, it 
might well be that   .  ( ̂)/    .  ( ̂)/ for some history  ̂, which indicates that Player   and 
Player   disagree about which of Player  ’s strategies would constitute appropriate behavior. 
11
 Recall that, for example, if some player     takes an action immediately after history  , then 
the value of the player function at   is  , i.e.:  ( )   . 
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stressed that, possibly depending on the degree of cultural heterogeneity of the 
players’ set  , it may not be obvious that one rule-complying strategy profile 
is more plausible than another rule-complying strategy profile, so conformist 
players have to form conjectures about “what would be normal to do” in the 
specific situation at hand. In fact, it should be noted that    may contain 
multiple elements (or, even if    is singleton, one behavioral rule might be 
ambiguous in that it could dictate multiple strategy profiles), hence a 
conformist player will have to form a conjecture    (  ( | ))      
indicating what she reckons that a player would do upon reaching each 
     . To sum up,    determines the set of rule-complying actions of the 
player active at   (i.e.: more precisely, the rules one is aware of determine a 
set   ( )  (  ( 
 )) of admissible/rule-complying actions), whereas    
determines which of these admissible actions are plausibly taken in the current 
play of  . Before proceeding, it is convenient to make the following 
assumption. 
 
Assumption 1. Given an extensive form game   and for each     a rule 
subset     , if     ̂(  ( 
 ))    for some  ̂      and  ( ̂)   , then 
       ( | ̂)    ( ̂).  
 
Assumption 1 states that in the case in which at some history  ̂ the set of rule-
complying actions is empty,    may assign positive probability to any action at 
that history (i.e.: to any action in   ( ̂)). In effect some behavioral rules (e.g.: 
the strict equality rule) may not be defined at all histories, so assumption 1 
makes it possible for    to assign positive probability to actions at each and 
every information set. Here the interpretation is that, if a player     gets to 
move at a node at which none of the rules in    is defined, then   is believed 
to be free to take any available action (or, equivalently, every action is 
considered “rule-complying”). 
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Now, I can move on to introduce the “relativist’s conception of moral 
choice”, as follows. 
 
Definition 3. A strategy   
  (    )      is a moral choice according to 
norm-conjecture    (  ( | ))      if the following condition holds for all 
     : 
Pr  (  
 |  )  Pr  (  | 
 )  
where Pr  (  | 
 ) is the conditional probability of a pure strategy of Player   
at    – derived from  ’s norm-conjecture    – and is calculated as Pr  (  | 
 )
 ∏   (    | )    . 
 
Notice that definition 3 describes moral choice as a strategy with the highest 
probability of being considered “currently-normal” or “appropriate”, given a 
rule subset   : again, it should be stressed that such a choice is still 
independent of payoff-maximization considerations. That said, the aim of this 
paper is not to advocate moral relativism, but to utilize moral relativism as one 
of the features characterizing conformist individuals. 
3. Conditionally conformist preferences 
A norm-driven decision maker   is modelled as a player with conditionally 
conformist preferences, whose expected utility function is a linear combination 
of her material payoff and a component representing some anticipated 
negative emotion (i.e.: a function of the sum of losses that other conformist 
players   would suffer because of a rule violation). To that end, one needs to 
define some player  ’s expectation of her material payoff, given her strategy    
and her initial belief    ( | 
 ) about the strategies of the co-players; so, 
drawing on Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s [2007] concept of simple guilt, such 
an expectation is given by E    [  | 
 ]  ∑      (   | 
 )  . (      )/. 
Here, if Player   is a conditionally conformist decision maker – and presumes 
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that her co-players are norm-driven too – she can form her belief    by 
assuming her co-players’ behavior to be consistent with some rule  .  
Now, the present theory assumes that players are naïve in the following 
way: if Player   presumes that her co-players are norm-driven, then she 
believes that they are aware of the same behavioral rules as hers.  
 
Assumption 2. Given an extensive form game   and a rule subset     , 
(unless the players’ awareness of the rule subsets is otherwise specified) 
Player   believes that the co-players’ rule subsets are the same as hers; that is, 
Player   believes that      ,      . 
 
As a consequence of assumption 2, if Player   presumes that her co-players are 
norm-driven, then she believes that they hold the same norm-conjecture as 
hers. It follows that Player   will form her first-order belief    by assuming her 
co-players’ behavior (at each history where they are active) to be consistent 
with her own norm-conjecture    .  ( | )/
     
. Notice that, here, her 
initial belief    ( | 
 ) will still correspond to a probability measure over 
the strategies of the opponents, except that now the support of    will contain 
only rule-complying strategies (according to  ’s rule subset   ). Thus, the 
probability of a certain strategy profile of all players other than   is now given 
by   (   | 
 )  Pr  (   | 
 )  ∏ ∏   (    | )             . Note that, for 
the sake of simplicity, the present theory assumes that players cannot 
randomize, yet randomized choices may enter the analysis as an expression of 
the players’ beliefs about the opponents’ (rule-complying) strategies. Given 
that, a norm-driven decision maker’s preferences are defined as follows. 
 
Definition 4. A norm-driven decision maker has conformist preferences 
characterized by a utility function   
  of the form 
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 (        )    ( )      
   
 (  ∑   2  E       [  | 
 ]    ( )3
   
)  
with        ( ),    ,   ) and where: 
    is Player  ’s sensitivity to the presumed norm; 
   
  is a dummy variable equal to one if   is aware of one or more 
behavioral rules applicable to the given game (i.e.:   
    whenever 
    ), equal to zero otherwise; 
   
  is a dummy variable equal to one if   believes that every     is 
aware and will also adhere to some    , equal to zero otherwise. 
 
It is now clear that the anticipated negative emotion is a function of any 
positive difference between the initially expected payoff to   and the payoff   
would get in the event of a rule violation. Note that   does not know what    
is: in effect    provides  ’s estimation of   , which   will compute by 
presuming that   holds the same norm-conjecture as hers; that is, Player  ’s 
estimation of   (   | 
 ) will be given by   (   | 
 )  Pr  (   | 
 )  
∏ ∏   (    | )             .  
To sum up, if   
   ,   
   , and      Player   will exhibit 
conformist preferences. It should be stressed that the sensitivity parameter    
sets the size of a hypothetical feeling of uneasiness of member   of a group in 
which, because of a rule violation, some other member’s welfare gets reduced: 
the underlying assumption is that individuals may feel resentment at injustice 
(Sugden [2000], Elster [1989], Ch. 6) – or rather here resentment at behavior 
different from an established pattern – and the anticipation of such resentment 
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would bring about a negative emotion on the part of a potential deviator; it is 
assumed that (while   
  and   
  are endogenously determined)    is 
exogenously given.
12, 13
 
4. Social norms 
Given the above apparatus, I shall introduce a set of conditions for a social 
norm to exist or, more precisely, conditions for a behavioral rule   to 
constitute a “social norm for  ”. Before proceeding it should be highlighted 
that the present theory differs from conventional social preference models in 
that the form of the current utility function incorporates a taste for conditional 
preferences, as is the case of an individual having a preference for conformity 
to some principle – whatever the relevant behavioral rule prescribes to her – 
                                  
12
 Obviously if      or   
    or   
    the utility function reduces to one of standard non-
conformist motivation. The reader can anticipate that the psychological component of such an 
expected utility function is always null in equilibrium. In fact, if   correctly expects that at least one 
player     will not adhere to some    , then   
  takes on value   (hence the psychological 
disutility is null); moreover, if   correctly expects that every player     will adhere to some     
and   herself adheres to that rule, then   
  takes on value   but no member’s welfare gets reduced 
(hence the psychological disutility is null). 
13
 It should be noted that the utility function of definition 4 differs from the one proposed by 
Bicchieri (Bicchieri [2006], Ch. 1) since, according to Bicchieri’s function, Player   would suffer a 
loss in utility also in the case in which she conforms to the norm but Player   does not and, by 
doing so,   gets a material payoff lower than the one implied by the norm. The two specifications 
further differ in that Bicchieri’s utility function does not involve a psychological component such 
that the opponents’ beliefs explicitly affect a player’s preferences (a fact that – when adapting 
Bicchieri’s utility function to dynamic games – would rule out the possibility of updating beliefs 
about the opponents’ norm-driven behavior). Here is a brief description of Bicchieri’s [2006] utility 
function: considering a normal form game, a norm    is defined as a (set-valued) function from 
one’s expectation about the opponents’ (rule-complying) strategies to one’s own strategies, that is, 
          , with        ; a strategy profile is said to instantiate a norm for Player   if     
   , and to violate a norm if      (   ). Player  ’s utility function is a linear combination of  ’s 
material payoff   ( ) and a component that depends on norm compliance:   ( )    ( )  
                   
2  .      (   )/    ( )  3, where      shows  ’s sensitivity to the 
norm and   refers to the norm violator. The norm-based component represents the maximum loss 
resulting from all norm violations: the first maximum operator aims at taking care of the possibility 
that there might be multiple rule-complying strategy profiles; the second maximum operator ranges 
over all the players other than the norm violator  .  
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only on condition that the others do not deviate from the precepts of that 
rule.
14
  
 
Definition 5. Let     be a behavioral rule applicable to a certain class   of 
mixed-motive games, where each game is a structure   〈      (  
 )
   
〉. 
  is a social norm for Player   of  , if the following conditions hold for  . 
1. (contingency)        
   . 
2. (conditional preference)      (  )       
 ( (  
     
 ))    
 ( (      
 )) 
for        , where  ( 
 ) is the set of strategy profiles completely 
consistent with  . That is,   prefers to adhere to   in a play of     : 
2.1. (empirical expectations) 
(
  (   | 
 )  ∏     (  | 
 )                  
           (  ( | ))      ∏   ( )  ( ( 
 ))     
)    
   ; 
    
2.2. (normative expectations) 
i.   
  (  )  .    (  | 
 )/
     
,     
ii.                            . 
  
A few comments are in order.
15
 Condition 1 states that   is aware of some 
behavioral rule   applicable to game  . Condition 2.1 states that   believes that 
                                  
14
 Recall that      
   
 .  ∑    2  E       [  | 
 ]    ( )3   / is to be intended as an 
anticipated negative emotion on the part of member   of a group in which peer  ’s welfare gets 
reduced: notice that the endogenously defined dummy   
  makes  ’s psychological loss immaterial 
unless   is the only deviator; that is,   is inclined to feel an aversion to rule-breaking through an 
anticipated negative emotion but, if someone else is already expected not to be adhering to the 
presumed norm (i.e.: if   
   ), then   does not care about  ’s welfare any longer. This is in 
contrast with conventional social preference models, where players may deviate (as long as it is 
convenient to them) while still experiencing a psychological loss. 
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every     adheres to        ;
16
 that is,  ’s first-order belief is derived 
from  ’s norm-conjecture   , with the support of    containing rule-complying 
actions as dictated at    by   (save for cases in which at some  ̂ the set of 
rule-complying actions is empty, in which case assumption 1 holds). Then, the 
interpretation of condition 2.2 is that   believes that every     believes that 
she ought to behave according to   . More precisely, condition 2.2 holds 
whenever its two components hold at once: (i) the first expression (i.e.: 
  
  (  )  .    (  | 
 )/
     
) states that   believes that every     expects 
her to behave according to  ’s norm-conjecture   , that is,  ’s second-order 
belief is derived from   ; (ii) the second component (i.e.:      and 
                  ) states that  ’s cost of some rule violation is 
psychologically hurting (whenever     , and even more so when 
E       [  | 
 ]    ( )    for some    , with    ) and is high enough to 
make  ’s deviation from   
  unprofitable.
17
 
Now, the above conditions for a social norm to exist are to be intended 
as those necessary for a behavioral rule   to be held in place: if fulfilled for 
every     a strategy profile dictated by   is an equilibrium, provided that all 
beliefs are correct and that players maximize expected utilities. Hence, 
                                                                                       
15
 The above set of conditions introduces a mathematically-precise definition of social norm, which 
formulizes Bicchieri’s [2006] philosophical conditions. In this respect note that Bicchieri’s 
construct differs from the present conditions, among the other issues, in that here if different 
players – incorrectly – expect different norms to be followed, then different behavioral rules 
constitute a social norm for each of the players. Obviously such a situation is impossible in 
equilibrium, where beliefs are correct. 
16
 Notice that   ( ) ( ( 
 )) is the set of rule-complying actions of the active player at history  , 
as dictated at    by  .  
17
 Formally the sufficiently-large-   requirement implies that        2 ̂ 
 ̃     ̂ 
 ̌ 3, where each 
 ̂ 
   is a sensitivity parameter such that   
 ( (      
 ))    
 ( (  
     
 )) for some      , with 
    (  ). 
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definition 5 results in a social norm (existing and) being “followed by 
population  ” if the conditions in remark 1 simultaneously hold. 
 
Remark 1. A social norm    (exists and) is followed by population   if: every 
player     has conformist preferences represented by a utility function   
 , 
with   
   ,   
   , and     ; every player   maximizes her expectation of 
  
 ; every   holds correct beliefs about every  ’s (   , with    ) first-order 
belief and behavior; every player  ’s behavior is consistent with one of the 
end-nodes yielded by          (according to norm-conjectures       for 
     );    is sufficiently large for every    . 
 
Note that the expression “a social norm    is followed by population  ” (or 
“every player     conforms to   ”) implies that every player in the 
population plays her part of one of the strategy profiles contained in   (  ).  
IV. Equilibrium concept 
In this section an equilibrium concept for mixed-motive games with belief-
dependent conformist preferences is discussed: by imposing the requirement 
that all beliefs (and norm-conjectures) are correct in equilibrium, I derive a 
“Social Sequential Equilibrium” as a special case of the sequential equilibrium 
notion of Kreps and Wilson [1982]. Kreps and Wilson’s definition of 
equilibrium consists of sequentially rational, consistent assessments where: (i) 
An assessment is a profile of behavioral strategies and conditional first-order 
beliefs (along with higher-order beliefs in Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s [2009] 
specification). (ii) An assessment is consistent if the profile   (  )    of 
first-order beliefs about the opponents’ strategies is derived from the 
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behavioral strategy profile   (  )   , that is, for      ,          , 
      , it must be that   (   | )  ∏ Pr  (  | )   ;
18
 given that, Battigalli 
and Dufwenberg’s [2009] specification of sequential equilibria for 
psychological games extends the consistency requirement by demanding that 
higher-order beliefs at each information set are correct for      ,       , 
that is,   ( )     . (iii) Finally, an assessment is sequentially rational if, for 
every player   and every information set     , the strategy of   is a best 
response to the other players’ strategies given  ’s beliefs at  . 
In the present framework I further extend the consistency requirement 
by imposing that Player  ’s (correct) beliefs about every  ’s first-order beliefs 
are derived from norm-conjectures   , with       (for      , with    ). 
It follows the definition of a “socially consistent assessment”. 
 
Definition 6. A socially consistent assessment is a profile (       )  
(           )    that specifies behavioral strategies, norm-conjectures, first- 
and second-order beliefs, such that for      ,          ,       : 
(i)   (   | )  ∏ Pr  (  | )   ; 
(ii)   ( )     ; 
(iii)   
  (  )  .    (  | 
 )/
     
 and 
.  ( | )/
          
 (  ( | ))     . 
  
Notice that condition (iii) in definition 6 is the distinguishing feature of a 
socially consistent assessment in that it implies that (not only are beliefs 
                                  
18
 Notice that, since    is derived from   (  )   , the beliefs of every player     about Player 
 ’s strategies must be the same. 
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derived from a behavioral strategy profile but also) a behavioral strategy 
profile   (  )    contains probability measures which equal those contained 
in every player’s norm-conjecture   .
19
  
The core equilibrium concept for mixed-motive games with belief-
dependent conformist preferences can now be presented. 
  
Definition 7. Given an extensive form game   〈      (  
 )
   
〉 and a rule 
subset      for each    , a Social Sequential Equilibrium (“SSE”) of   is 
a socially consistent assessment, such that for      ,       ,     
  
  ( ): 
    (  
 | )    (  
    (  ( 
 ))       
        
     ( )
E        [  
 | ])  
 
In plain words, a socially consistent assessment is a social sequential 
equilibrium iff each probability measure     ( | ) assigns positive conditional 
probability only to conditional expected-payoff maximizing rule-complying 
strategies; that is, every player   holds the same conjecture about the actions 
consistent with some rule in    and maximizes the expectation of the utility 
function (given her correct belief systems). Note that here it is assumed 
common knowledge of the utility functions   
 , implying that the sensitivity 
parameters    are commonly known (and are, in effect, sufficiently large) as 
well as the fact that each player   knows that every     adheres to some 
                                  
19
 Following Kreps and Wilson [1982], condition (i) can be written under the assumption that there 
is a strictly positive sequence      such that each    is completely mixed and each belief 
  
 (   | ) is derived from  
  using Bayes’ rule. This allows not to restrict a player’s belief system 
to information sets reached with positive probability only: in other words, the probability of events 
conditional on zero-probability events must approximate probabilities that are derived from 
behavioral strategies assigning positive probability to every action at every information set. 
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        (i.e.: resulting in   
   ), given that each player’s rule subset is 
non-empty (i.e.: resulting in   
   ).20 
So, it should be highlighted that if condition 1 of definition 5 (i.e.: 
       
   ) holds for every player       and every       holds 
correct norm-conjectures       (as well as first- and second-order beliefs), 
then either of the following equilibrium scenarios is possible: 
(i) conditions 2.1-2.2 of definition 5 hold for every player         
social norm    exists (for        ) and is followed by population   
  a social sequential equilibrium of   occurs; 
(ii) conditions 2.1-2.2 of definition 5 do not hold  social norm   does 
not exist for any player       (and it is not followed by population 
 )   a social sequential equilibrium of   does not occur (yet a 
subgame perfect equilibrium occurs if   is a game with observable 
actions; a standard sequential equilibrium à la Kreps and Wilson 
occurs otherwise). 
Note that in scenario (ii) the utility function reduces to one of classical, non-
conformist motivation, which justifies the standard notions of equilibrium 
adopted. It should be stressed that – for a given extensive form game  , and a 
                                  
20
 Note that (if   
    and   
   ) one could define a consistent assessment à la Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg [2009] by dropping condition (iii) of definition 6 above; given that, their equilibrium 
notion can be obtained by dropping the requirement that each probability measure     ( | ) assign 
positive conditional probability only to rule-complying strategies in definition 7 above. Also note 
that every game with simple guilt has a sequential equilibrium à la Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
[2007] irrespective of the magnitude of the sensitivity parameter (  )    (i.e.: parameter     in their 
notation); conversely, here, a player with utility function   
  has conditionally conformist 
preferences such that if, for some player    ,  ’s cost of a rule violation is not high enough to 
make  ’s deviation from   
  unprofitable (i.e.:    is not sufficiently large), then condition 2.1 of 
definition 5 will not hold for every other player   (i.e.: resulting in   
   ) and so the utility 
function   
  will reduce to one of classical (“non-psychological”) motivation, thereby implying a 
standard notion of equilibrium. 
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rule subset      for each     – the existence of a social sequential 
equilibrium is ultimately conditional on players’ sensitivity parameters 
(  )   : this sublimely captures the fragility of social norms in actual society. 
That said, having assumed sufficiently large (  )    parameters, an 
existence proof that relies on Selten’s trembling hand argument can be 
conveniently adapted from Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2009].
21
 Finally, the 
following result is a direct consequence of definition 7. 
 
Remark 2. Given an extensive form game  , and a rule subset      for 
each    , if a certain social norm       (exists and) is followed by 
population  , then some social sequential equilibrium of   occurs. 
 
Notice that the converse is not necessarily true as a certain socially consistent, 
sequentially rational assessment (i.e.: a social sequential equilibrium) might be 
induced by multiple behavioral rules in  , some of which may not even belong 
to    for some    .
22
  
                                  
21
 Battigalli and Dufwenberg point out that, in some cases, other solution concepts might depict the 
dynamics of certain types of belief-dependent motivations more satisfactorily than some variant of 
Kreps and Wilson’s [1982] sequential equilibrium could do (e.g.: “weakly consistent perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium”, self-confirming equilibrium, etc.). Space constraints do not permit further 
discussion here, but the reader may refer to Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2009] for a psychological 
forward induction argument. 
22
 For example, consider a 2-player game and let each player’s rule subset be defined as    
*     +. Then, assume that, at the root of the game, behavioral rule    dictates the strategy 
profiles   (  )  *(   ) (   )+ whereas rule    dictates the strategy profiles   (  )  
*(   ) (   )+ (with each pair of lower-case letters denoting a strategy profile). Further, assume 
that both players have preferences represented by utility functions (  
 )    and that, while holding 
correct beliefs, they play the strategy profile (   ). Now, while (   ) is a social sequential 
equilibrium of the game, this does not necessarily imply that, say,    (rather than   ) constitutes a 
social norm and is being followed by the players of the game. Interestingly, this well captures the 
case of a traveller who, once in a foreign country, observes some locals interacting (without taking 
part in the actual game herself): while the outcome of the interaction may turn out to be compatible 
with some of the behavioral rules stored in the observer’s mind, she may not be able to tell which 
one has been held in place, especially if the foreign country is particularly culturally-different from 
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V. Applications 
In this section I turn to analyse a few dynamic interactions accounting for 
conditionally conformist preferences. Before that, I shall formally define a few 
behavioral rules reflecting principles which are usually assumed to regulate 
behavior in social dilemmas.
23
 
 Equality principle:  
  ( )  *   ( )       ;  ( ) s.t.  ( )        ( )+. 
 Inequity-reducing principle: 
  ( )  2   ( )       ;  ( ) s.t.         
   
.
 
 
∑ ,  ( )     
 ̅( )- /3.24 
 Classical-utilitarian welfare maximization principle: 
  ( )  {
   ( )  
     ;  ( ) s.t.         
   
(∑   ( )   )
}. 
 Rawlsian (minimax) welfare maximization principle: 
  ( )  2   ( )       ;  ( ) s.t.         
   
 ( ( ))3, 
where  ( ( ̂)) denotes a Rawlsian social welfare function and is 
defined as (  ( ̂)     ( ̂))     
   
 *  ( ̂)     ( ̂)+. 
It should be stressed that the above rules do not aim at representing the whole 
range of norms that may emerge in strategic interactions but is only meant to 
provide a simple illustration of the conditions under which conformity sets in. 
                                                                                       
hers; on a smaller case, a similar problem occurs the first time we happen to interact with members 
of a group, organization or institution whose social norms we do not yet know.  
23
 Note that, below,  ( ) denotes the union of the sets of strategy profiles dictated by the 
behavioral rule at each history      . 
24
 Note that  ̅( ) denotes the mean value of the players’ material payoffs, for a given terminal 
node  . 
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(Also, note that a behavioral rule could be constructed by combining two or 
more of the above principles.)  
1. Dictator Games 
Consider the following variant of the dictator game: as in the original version 
(Forsythe et al. [1994]) each subject is given an endowment to allocate; but, 
here, assume that whatever money the dictator gives to her co-player will be 
multiplied by a factor  .  
 
Figure 2 - Dictator Game with factorized donations “FDG” 
 
For example, consider the game tree of Figure 2: Player 1 is endowed with $3 
and can choose to give any (integer) amount between 0 and 3 to Player 2; also, 
let   *     +. It is straightforward to see that, when      , the strategies 
dictated by the above-defined behavioral rules are as follows:   (  )  * +, 
  (  )  * +,   (  )  * + and   (  )  * +; instead, when    , 
  (  )  * +,   (  )  * +,   (  )  * + and   (  )  * +.  
Now, let the dictator’s endowment and donation be denoted by   and 
 , respectively, with the donation being any integer   ,   -. Below are a 
few results showing how the dictator’s optimal donation (i.e.: action) varies 
with behavioral rules and factor  . 
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Proposition 1. Given the behavioral rules   ,    , the only SSE of     is 
  
 
   
, whenever    
 
   (   )
. 
Proof: Firstly note that, for a given endowment   and for some factor  , the 
set of strategies dictated by behavioral rule   (  ) (or   (  )) is singleton, 
that is,   (  )  2  
 
   
3. Hence, the norm-conjecture induced by   , for 
     , is such that   .  
 
   
/   . Given that, Player 1 can form her 
belief    by assuming her co-player’s first-order beliefs to be consistent with 
her norm-conjecture: thus Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s (expected) 
material payoff at    equals E    ,  | 
 -    .  
 
   
/   
 
   
; this implies 
that Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s potential disappointment at (  
 |  ) would equal E    ,  | 
 -    ( ( ))   
 
   
    
 
   
; in turn, 
this implies that Player 1’s psychological utility at (   |  ) would be given 
by   
 ( ( )      )     ̂ 
 0  . 
 
   
/1. On the other hand, Player 1’s 
utility (=payoff) at .  
 
   
|  / is given by   
 . .
 
   
/       /  
  ( .
 
   
/)    
 
   
; it follows that Player 1’s conformist preferences 
against     can be expressed as   
 ( ( )      )    
 . .
 
   
/       /  
   ̂ 
 0  . 
 
   
/1    
 
   
, which implies that    
 
   (   )
. 
 
Corollary 1. Given the behavioral rule   , the only SSE of     is   
 
   
, 
whenever    
 
   (   )
.  Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2. Given the behavioral rule   , the following SSE of     may 
occur: 
a) for    , the only SSE is    ,      or 
b) for    , the only SSE is     whenever    
 
    
. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Andreoni and Miller [2002] designed a similar experimental game, where each 
dictator was given a menu of choices with different endowments: specifically, 
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endowments were either 40, 60, 75, 80 or 100, while   varied between     
and  . How does this relate to the above analysis? Quite clearly one can 
hypothesize that, in the experiment, a player with preferences for conformity 
to some equity principle would increase her allocation to her partner if she 
knew she had a low  , compared to the case of a high   (where she would 
decrease her donation); instead, a player with preferences for conformity to 
some efficiency principle would keep (almost) everything if   was less than 1, 
and give away (almost) everything if   was greater than 1. Now, Andreoni and 
Miller’s experiment was not designed to test for belief-dependent conformist 
preferences, but simply to check whether people have consistent preferences 
across different rounds (featuring different   or  ). Interestingly their 
experimental results show that, for different subjects, different forms of other-
regarding principles were practiced, and that a majority of subjects behaved 
consistently across rounds. Indeed, about 40% of subjects exhibited selfish 
preferences, around 25% conformed to an equity principle, 11% maximized 
overall social welfare, and the remaining 24% acted idiosyncratically from 
round to round.
25
  
Conventional social preference models find it hard to explain how 
subjects’ actions may vary in accord with their knowledge about the partners’ 
knowledge of a one-to-one mapping between – fair vs. unfair – actions and 
outcomes. In this respect, one of Dana et al.’s [2007] experimental treatments 
allowed dictators the possibility of losing agency if they did not choose an 
action within a relatively long time interval (in a standard dictator game). 
More precisely, dictators were instructed that they would have a 10-second 
                                  
25
 In the absence of data about subjects’ conjectures, one might well assume that those subjects 
exhibiting consistent preferences believed it was appropriate to behave according to some 
principle. 
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interval during which to enter their choices and that, if they had not chosen an 
action at a randomly selected point in the interval, the computer program 
would cut them off and choose between an equal and an unequal payoff 
allocation (the latter being advantageous to the dictator), with same 
probability. Given that only the dictator would be notified if a cut-off 
occurred, the respective receiver could not tell whether her payoff was 
determined by the dictator’s action or the computer program: so, in the eyes of 
the receiver, this feature made it plausible for unequal outcomes to have 
resulted from a random device even in the case in which they were actually 
due to the dictator’s action; interestingly, Dana et al.’s results show that – 
among dictators that were not cut off – a majority picked the selfish action, 
that is, a proportion higher than the proportion of selfish choices in the 
baseline treatment (where there was no possibility of being cut off). Their 
results further show that the dictators’ response time was often longer than in 
the baseline treatment, a fact that resulted in almost 1 in 4 dictators being cut 
off; therefore, it seems that many subjects were willing to delay making a 
choice, perhaps trying to avoid the responsibility of making an unfair choice. 
Now, the present theory is capable of making sense of these results, as 
follows: in the baseline treatment the subjects’ rule subset could be defined as 
   * 
 + while in the above-mentioned treatment it could be defined as 
   * 
    +, with    being a “random device rule” (which prescribes that 
strategies be chosen through a random device). Given that any final outcome 
is compatible with the random device rule – and given that only the dictator 
was notified if a cut-off occurred – it turns out that dictators exploited this 
asymmetry: (i) by choosing the selfish action more often than they did in the 
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baseline treatment (thinking that the receiver would believe that the dictator 
had been cut off, that is, had followed the random device rule); (ii) or else by 
delaying their choice in order to be cut off (hence effectively following the 
random device rule).
26
 
2. Ultimatum Games 
The ultimatum game (Güth et al. [1982]) provides a simple 2-player model of 
bargaining, where Player 1 (the “proposer”) suggests how to divide a given 
sum  , and Player 2 (the “responder”) can either accept or reject this 
proposal: if the responder rejects, neither player receives anything; if she 
accepts, the money is split according to the proposal (i.e.:     to Player 1, 
and   to Player 2). Assume the proposer’s set of actions contains integers in 
the interval ,   - (where   is an even number) and the responder’s set of 
actions at each decision node is *   +, with   denoting acceptance and   
denoting rejection. In this case,   (  ) (or   (  )) contains strategy profiles 
whereby the proposer offers any amount, and the responder either accepts or 
declines an offer      ,27 and declines all offers other than      .  
 
Proposition 3. Given the behavioral rules   ,    , there is only one SSE of the 
ultimatum game: for   (      | 
 )   ,   (       |   )    and 
                                  
26
 It should be stressed that this interpretation of Dana et al.’s [2007] results is founded on the 
assumption that in many games people consider choosing through a random device as appropriate 
as picking an equal allocation in the first place (see Bicchieri and Chavez [2013] for strong 
experimental evidence in support of such an assumption). Formally, defining the players’ rule 
subset as    * 
    + implies that norm-conjectures    are such that any one of the dictator’s 
actions could be assigned probability 1, which in turn implies that the dictator’s utility from 
choosing an unequal payoff allocation would not involve a psychological loss (as, in any case, 
there would be no deviation from   ).   
27
 In fact, whether the responder accepts or declines a 50-50 offer, players will get an equal amount 
of money (for a given terminal node), i.e.: in the case of acceptance each will get half the sum  , 
whereas in the case of rejection each will get $0. 
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  (          |     )   ; the only SSE is given by 
.
 
 
       
 
 
            
 
 
/ whenever     .  Proof: See Appendix.
28
 
 
Unlike models that combine intentionality with distributional concerns, like 
Falk-Fischbacher [2006] or Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger [2004], the present 
theory is less indeterminate (given some inequity-reducing principle such as 
  ), since it only involves one psychological equilibrium besides the standard 
subgame perfect equilibrium.
29
 In this respect, the reader might object that the 
present theory is more indeterminate than the others if one considers 
alternative behavioral rules (e.g.: either          or   ). However, in the 
laboratory this kind of indeterminacy in predictions is easily overcome if the 
game of interest is preceded by a pre-play stage featuring an elicitation method 
so as to obtain ratings of the extent to which different actions (in different 
hypothetical games) are believed to be collectively perceived as appropriate; 
then, from the actions that are considered appropriate, the experimenter can 
                                  
28
 It should be noted that the strategy profile .
 
 
         
 
 
             
 
 
/ would not 
qualify as an SSE – given    – because (as per definition 7 above) in equilibrium every player 
should assign positive probability to rule-complying actions, if any, also at decision nodes off the 
equilibrium path. In fact, it should be recalled that    dictates a strategy profile that minimizes 
differences in material outcomes, which implies that a conditionally conformist responder should 
be willing to give up an offer       if the value she attaches to principles (i.e.:   ) is greater 
than the material payoffs at stake: one may think of it as unwillingness to accept an undue 
inducement. This goes beyond the purposes of the present theory, but of course one can easily 
define a less stringent rule such that it dictates the strategy profile 
.
 
 
         
 
 
             
 
 
/, in order to make more realistic predictions. In this regard, 
experimental data (Camerer [2003], Ch. 2) are partly consistent with the unique SSE yielded by the 
over-simplistic   , since modal offers are usually 40 to 50 percent and such offers are rarely 
rejected; also, there are hardly any offers in the categories 0 to 10 percent and over 50 percent (but 
it is hard to believe that someone’s    could be so large to reject an offer over 50 percent in the lab, 
as dictated by   ). 
29
 In those models responders have thresholds of offers they always accept or reject (based on the 
subjects’ fairness sensitivity), which in effect yield multiple equilibria.  
- 32 - 
 
deduce some general rules and can therefore apply such rules to make 
predictions in other mixed-motive games. (In this connection, Krupka and 
Weber [2013] make use of an incentivized pre-play elicitation method for 
identifying social norms, which uses simple coordination games where people 
guess what is believed to be more or less appropriate in each context.) For 
instance in the case of the ultimatum game if, in some pre-play stage, subjects 
expressed preferences compatible with an efficiency rule such as the classical-
utilitarian welfare maximization principle   , then the present theory would 
predict a unique SSE where – for any positive    – the proposer offers $0 and 
the responder accepts all offers.
30
   
3. Trust Games 
Consider the following trust game. At the initial node   , Player 1 (the 
“trustor”) chooses either “a” or “b”: when opting for “b” the game terminates 
and material outcomes are allocated as shown in the vector of payoffs at the 
end-node  ( ); if Player 1 opts for “a” the choice passes to Player 2 (the 
“trustee”), who in turn can decide on “c” or “d”, the consequences of which 
are shown in the vector of payoffs at the end-nodes  ( ) and  ( ), 
respectively. Let the parameters   and   be such that     and    . 
                                  
30
 Similarly, some algebra shows that if subjects expressed preferences for conformity to a 
Rawlsian (minimax) welfare maximization principle   , then the present theory would predict a 
unique SSE whereby the proposer offers     whenever    
 
   
, and the responder accepts all 
offers. 
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Figure 3 - Trust Game “TG” 
 
The following results refer to potential, alternative specifications of the rule 
subsets. 
 
Proposition 4. Given the behavioral rules   ,    , the only SSE of    is 
(   ), whenever    
  
    
.  Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Corollary 2. Given the behavioral rule   , the only SSE of    is (   ), 
whenever    
  
    
.  Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 5. Given the behavioral rule   , the following SSE of    may 
occur: 
a) for   ( | ( ))   ; (   ), whenever    
  
    
 or 
b) for   ( | ( ))   ; (   ), whenever    
 
       
. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
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Notice that scenario (b) in proposition 5 (i.e.: SSE (   )) provides an instance 
of a socially undesirable solution: in fact, Player 1 conforms to    because her 
cost of a norm violation is high enough to make her deviation from   
    
unprofitable (if    
 
       
).
31
  
The above exercise suggests that the range of equilibria observed 
across experimental trust games might vary with conjectures about norms, 
with such beliefs being induced by a variety of context- and culture-dependent 
principles. For example, Xiao and Bicchieri [2010] analyse a trust game 
similar to the one above (but where the trustee’s action set contains multiple 
options), and compare experimental results with a treatment variant in which 
differences in the payoff distribution at  ( ) make it possible for the precepts 
of the equality principle and a reciprocity principle to conflict. It should be 
noted that, unlike the equality rule    – which is defined with reference to 
material payoffs at terminal nodes only – the reciprocity principle takes into 
account also actions: that is, the reciprocity rule    can be defined so as to 
dictate a strategy profile where the trustor passes an amount   (choosing  , in 
the above notation) on to the trustee, and the trustee chooses any action (this 
time among her multiple options) such that she returns at least   to the trustor. 
                                  
31
 Even though an equilibrium consisting of the strategy profile (   ) may at first seem an 
unrealistic solution, this actually captures many situations characterized by the internalization of a 
socially undesirable norm: an example is given by a set of circumstances where a woman (marries 
and) brings a dowry to a man of dubious reputation; in effect, she (Player 1) may lucidly expect the 
man (Player 2) to use and invest the dowry, keeping all the proceeds for himself and, still, she may 
prefer to marry him if the local culture pushes women to get a husband. Thus if the cost of 
deviating is high, the influence of culture and its norms is such that the woman is indifferent 
between remaining unmarried (i.e.: (     )  (   )) and getting married-but-losing-everything 
(i.e.: (     )  (   )). Another example of a social norm inducing an extremely undesirable 
outcome is female genital mutilation. In a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East this 
practice is supported by both men and women: most interestingly, in the majority of cases it is 
particularly supported by women as they consider such a practice a source of authority and honour 
(Bicchieri [2013]). 
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Xiao and Bicchieri’s [2010] experimental results show that the trustees’ 
normative expectations are consistent with a reciprocity principle only when it 
is in their interest, and are otherwise consistent with an equality principle; so, 
the conclusion is that different behavioral rules are made salient in different 
experimental treatments, and solutions vary accordingly.
32
 
Furthermore, there is ample consensus that different cultures give 
prominence to different behavioral rules and, hence, different conjectures 
about norms. In this connection, Johnson and Mislin [2011] have collected 
data from 162 replications of the original Berg et al. [1995] trust game (with a 
total of 23,000 participants) so as to identify the effect of experimental 
protocols and geographic variation on trust and trustworthiness. Among the 
other things, their findings show that trustworthiness is significantly affected 
by the factor by which the experimenter multiplies the amount sent (i.e.:  , in 
the above notation). Moreover, Johnson and Mislin find robust evidence that 
subjects send less in trust games conducted in Africa than those in North 
America, which might indicate that people in Africa are sensitive to behavioral 
rules different from those followed in North America. 
4. Public Goods Games 
In a public goods game each of   players is endowed with a sum of money  , 
and can voluntarily invest part (or all) of it in a public good that has a total 
per-unit value of    . Let Player  ’s contribution be any (integer) amount 
                                  
32
 In terms of the present theory, their results can be interpreted as follows: first, define the players’ 
rule subset as    * 
    +, then let the active player select an action (among the admissible 
actions as determined by   ) that best serves her interests and accordingly fix everyone’s norm-
conjectures   . More concretely, if    is defined as above for all players, and a player chooses an 
action which is consistent with only one of those rules, say   , then this means that all players will 
have formed their norm-conjectures in such a way as to assign positive probability only to actions 
prescribed by   . 
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   ,   -, and her payoff function be given by   ( (       ))    
   
 ∑   
 
 
 
. Let the game be modelled as a sequential game with imperfect 
information, where players do not know what actions were chosen by previous 
players. 
 
Proposition 6. Given the behavioral rule   , the only SSE of the public goods 
game involves a strategy profile where every player’s contribution equals 
     whenever    
 (   )
    (   )
 for      .  Proof: See Appendix.33 
 
Corollary 3. Given the behavioral rules   ,    , there is a set of SSE of the 
public goods game, in which each equilibrium involves a strategy profile 
where every player’s contribution equals      whenever    
 (   )
    (   )
 for 
     . (The proof is analogous to that of proposition 6, and is therefore 
omitted.) 
 
It should be noted that proposition 6 implies that, when the value   is greater 
than the number of players  , it is always optimal to follow the social norm: 
obviously, in that case the return on investment is a motivation sufficiently 
strong to make one follow the norm. On the other hand, when (   ) is 
positive, the value a player attaches to principles (i.e.:   ) must provide a 
sufficiently strong motivation for one to be willing to conform.  
Once again, the above exercise suggests that the range of equilibria 
observed across experimental public goods games might vary with conjectures 
                                  
33
 Note that the Rawlsian (minimax) welfare maximization principle    yields the same SSE. 
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about norms,
34
 with such beliefs being induced by a variety of context- and 
culture-dependent principles. The intuition is confirmed by a large cross-
cultural experimental study undertaken in fifteen small-scale societies 
(Henrich et al. [2001]): the investigation addressed the question of whether the 
individuals’ social environments shape behavior, by recruiting experimental 
subjects from small-scale societies that present a wide variety of economic and 
cultural features. Henrich et al.’s [2001] results show that group-level 
differences in the structure and organization of everyday economic activity 
explain a substantial part of the experimental variation observed across 
societies; in other words, the higher the degree of market integration and the 
higher the payoffs to cooperation of everyday life, the greater the level of 
cooperation in experimental games. 
VI. Closing Remarks 
This essay has presented an original theory of conformist preferences in social 
dilemmas, building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s [2009] framework for the 
analysis of dynamic psychological games. The present theory departs from the 
                                  
34
 In this regard, note that Fischbacher and Gächter [2010] report a large degree of preference 
heterogeneity in public goods games: in a first experiment, using a variant of Selten’s strategy 
method, they assessed subjects’ willingness to contribute; their data show that about 55% of 
subjects linearly condition their contributions on the contribution levels of others, 23% of subjects 
exhibit selfish preferences, about 12% of subjects increase their own contributions with the 
contribution levels of others up to a point (and then decrease their own contributions with 
increasing levels of others’ contributions), and the remaining 10% of subjects exhibit idiosyncratic 
preferences. In a second experiment, Fischbacher and Gächter elicited subjects’ beliefs about the 
others’ contributions, and found that subjects’ contributions depend directly on such beliefs; also, 
they found that subjects are on average “imperfect conditional cooperators” in that they match 
others’ contributions only partly (e.g.: by contributing a little less than they expect others to 
contribute), which may explain why contributions decline in repeated public goods games. To 
conclude, Fischbacher and Gächter [2010] have designed their investigation so that they could use 
the first experiment to make a point prediction for each participant about her contribution in the 
second experiment (given her beliefs); in terms of the present theory, this roughly corresponds to 
using the first experiment to derive a behavioral rule for each participant, and then using such a 
rule to make predictions in the second experiment. 
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existing game-theoretic literature on social preferences, since it conceives of 
social norms as equilibrium selection devices while providing a set of 
conditions for a social norm to exist. Although the motivational factors 
considered here are related to the much-investigated concepts of fairness and 
reciprocity, it should be noted that the focus of this study has been on a “mere” 
conformity motivation in social dilemmas, implying that the peers’ (presumed) 
behavior and expectations – be it fair or not – serve the individual as a means 
to guiding her own actions. 
It should be stressed that the focus of this study has been on why rules 
are followed, rather than on the specifics of what the rules are. This implies 
that the present theory can account for the reasons that have led to the 
perpetuation of a given norm, but not for the reasons that have led to the 
evolution of an individual’s rule subset (which is exogenously determined) 
and consequent norm-conjectures. Notice that this is due to the fact that the 
model partly relies on past behavior to explain future compliance: in effect, it 
is the individual’s culture that marks out each player’s rule subset so that it 
contains rules of behavior in accordance with set usage; as a consequence, this 
theory implies a tendency for individuals to conform to the presumed 
“currently-normal” behavior.  
Now, the above considerations might seem to limit the potential for 
policy application of this theory in that it relies on an exogenous (culture-
dependent) specification of the rule subsets, which implies that the system will 
not evolve away from its current position unless some variation in conjectures 
about norms occurs. But it is precisely because of the fact that social norms 
depend on such conjectures that this theory suggests that – if beliefs are 
“manipulated” – it may be possible to induce pro-social behavior at low cost! 
Indeed, a finely-tuned process of belief transmission can effectively favour the 
occurrence of the desired policy outcome: for instance, social psychology 
research conducted at several U.S. universities shows that students hold 
exaggerated beliefs about the alcohol consumption habits of their peers 
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(Berkowitz and Perkins [1986]). Such studies have concluded that students 
consume greater quantities of alcohol in order to fit in with their perceptions 
of acceptable social behavior, that is, in order to comply with their presumed 
drinking norm in operation on campus. Research further shows that students 
that participate in a peer-oriented discussion (focusing on correcting biased 
perceptions) report drinking significantly less: in particular, a study from the 
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, an agency of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, shows that several 
educational institutions that consistently organize peer-oriented discussions 
have experienced reductions of up to twenty percent in high-risk drinking over 
a relatively short period of time (NIAAA [2002]). 
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VIII. For Online Publication: Appendix 
Proof of Corollary 1. Given an end-node  ̂   , a Rawlsian social welfare function is 
defined as  (  ( ̂)   ( ̂))     
   
 *  ( ̂)   ( ̂)+; such a function has to be 
evaluated at each of the    end-nodes of the game tree. Then, it is straightforward 
to see that here the set of maximizers of  is singleton: so, for a given endowment  
and for some factor  , the set of strategies dictated by behavioral rule   (  ) is 
singleton, that is,   (  )  2  
 
   
3. The rest of the proof is analogous to that of 
proposition 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) The proof of the first equilibrium is straightforward, and is 
therefore omitted. (b) As for the second (somewhat extreme) scenario, note that for a 
given endowment  and for some factor  , the set of strategies dictated by behavioral 
rule   (  ) is singleton, that is,   (  )  *   +. Hence, the norm-conjecture 
induced by   , for      , is such that   (   )   . Given that, Player 1 can 
form her belief    by assuming her co-player’s first-order beliefs to be consistent 
with her norm-conjecture: thus Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s (expected) 
material payoff at    equals E    ,  | 
 -    (   )       ; this implies 
that Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s potential disappointment at (   |  ) 
would equal E    ,  | 
 -    ( ( ))         ; in turn, this implies that 
Player 1’s psychological utility at (   |  ) would be given by   
 ( ( )      )  
   ̂ 
 ,  (  )-. On the other hand, Player 1’s utility (=payoff) at (   |  ) is 
given by   
 ( ( )      )    ( ( ))   ; it follows that Player 1’s conformist 
preferences against     can be expressed as 
  
 ( ( )      )    
 ( ( )      )     ̂ 
 ,  (  )-   , which implies that 
   
 
    
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that   (  ) (or   (  )) contains strategy profiles 
whereby the proposer offers any amount, and the responder either accepts or declines 
an offer      , and declines all offers other than      . This implies that the 
norm-conjecture induced by   , for      , is such that:    may take on value 1 for 
any one of Player 1’s actions; and    takes on value 0 for all actions   following an 
offer      , whereas    may take on either value 0 or value 1 for action   
following    . Given that, Player 1 can form her belief    by assuming her co-
player’s behavior to be consistent with her norm-conjecture: Player 1’s initial belief 
   ( | 
 ) corresponds to a probability measure over the strategies of the opponent, 
with the support of    containing only Player 2’s rule-complying strategies; hence, 
Player 1 can calculate her expected utility from each of her actions, as follows. First, 
denoting the probability that Player 2 accepts an     offer as  ̂ (i.e.:  ̂  
    (       |   )), Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s (expected) material 
payoff at    equals E      ,  | 
 -     (   | 
 )  . ̂  
 
 
 (   ̂)   /  
  (   | 
 )   ̂   . Further, if Player 1 chooses any action      , then Player 2 
will update her beliefs based on the fact that   (     | 
 )    for a certain 
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    ; this implies that Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s potential disappointment 
at (     |  ) would be null as there is no deviation, and the above expression for 
E      ,  | 
 - is simply updated so that   (   | 
 )   ; in turn, this implies that 
Player 1’s expected utility at  (     ) would not involve a psychological loss. 
Now, before considering Player 1’s remaining action (i.e.: offering   ), let’s look at 
the strategic interaction from Player 2’s perspective: in order to calculate the optimal 
action at each history after which Player 2 has to move, she will compare her utility 
from conforming against the utility from deviating from the presumed norm (e.g.: 
accepting an offer      ); so, for all histories following actions      , Player 
2’s utility from deviating would equal   
 (       )     ̂ 
 ,   -     ̂ 
 ;
35
 
instead, Player 2’s utility at . |  
 
 
/ would simply correspond to her material 
payoff (i.e.:   
 ( (   )      )    ( ( ))   ). In brief, Player 2’s conformist 
preferences can be expressed as:   
 ( (   )      )    
 ( (   )      )    
 ̂ 
     ̂ 
   , which means that – given some offer       – Player 2 will 
prefer to conform (thereby rejecting offer  ) if her sensitivity parameter is weakly 
greater than  ; then, the sufficiently-large-   requirement (for social norms  
 ,     to 
exist for Player 2) imposes that        2( ̂ 
 )
     
3, that is,     . On the 
other hand, if Player 1 offered    , Player 2 would fortify her belief that  ̂
    (       |   )    (in fact, it is mutually beneficial), which implies that 
Player 2’s preferences, when  ̂   , are such that   
 . .
 
 
  /       /  
  
 . .
 
 
  /       /. Player 1 will figure this out and indeed make an     offer, 
which Player 2 will accept. To conclude, recalling that a socially consistent 
assessment is an SSE (definition 7 above) if each probability measure     ( | ) 
assigns positive conditional probability only to conditional expected-payoff 
maximizing rule-complying strategies, it follows that the only SSE is the one given 
by proposition 3: in plain words, the proposer will make a 50-50 offer, and the 
responder will reject any offer other than that (whenever     ). In contrast, if 
     behavioral rule  
  is not a social norm and is not followed by population   
(by remark 1 above).  
 
Proof of Proposition 4. Firstly, note that   (  ) (or   (  )) contains the following 
dictated strategy profiles:   (  )  *(   ) (   )+. So the norm-conjecture induced 
by   , for      , can be represented by the following matrix:  
                                  
35
 Notice that Player 2’s expectation of Player 1’s (expected) material payoff at (     |  ) 
equals E    0  |  
 
 
1   . 
- 43 - 
 
   [
  ( | 
 )   ( | 
 )
  ( | ( ))   ( | ( ))
]  0
 ̂    ̂
  
1  
where  ̂  *   +; that is, if  ̂    then strategy profile (   ) is implemented, whereas 
if  ̂    then (   ) is implemented. Given that, Player 1 can form her belief    by 
assuming her co-player’s behavior to be consistent with her norm-conjecture: this 
way Player 1 can calculate her expected payoff as well as the opponent’s expected 
payoff and potential disappointment from 1’s not conforming to the presumed norm. 
In brief, Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s (expected) material payoff at    equals 
E      ,  | 
 -     ̂   (   ̂). Further, if Player 1 chose action  , then Player 
2 would update her beliefs based on the fact that  ̂   : this implies that Player 1’s 
expectation of Player 2’s potential disappointment at ( |  ) would be null as  ̂    
in the expression E      ,  | 
 -    ( ( ))     ̂   (   ̂)       ̂    ̂; 
in turn, this implies that Player 1’s utility at ( |  ) would simply correspond to her 
material payoff because there would be no deviation from   , hence no psychological 
loss (i.e.:   
 ( ( )         )    ( ( ))   ). On the other hand, Player 1’s 
expected utility (=expected payoff) at  ( ) is given by E    ,  | ( )-       
  ; it follows that Player 1’s conformist preferences can be expressed as 
  
 ( ( )         )  E    ,  | ( )-      , which is always satisfied because 
   . Similarly, Player 2’s expectation of Player 1’s (expected) material payoff at 
   equals E      ,  | 
 -     ̂   (   ̂). But if Player 1 chooses action  , then 
Player 2 will update her beliefs based on the fact that  ̂   : this implies that Player 
2’s expectation of Player 1’s potential disappointment at ( | ( )) would equal 
E    ,  | ( )-    ( ( ))           ; in turn, this implies that Player 2’s 
utility at ( | ( ))  would equal   
 ( ( )      )    ( ( ))    0  
.E    ,  | ( )-    ( ( ))/1        (    ), whereas Player 2’s utility 
(=payoff) at ( | ( )) is simply given by   
 ( ( )      )    ( ( ))    . Finally, 
Player 2’s conformist preferences against   can be expressed as   
 ( ( )      )  
  
 ( ( )      )        (    )        
  
    
. It follows that the only 
norm-conjecture induced by    that yields an SSE is given by the matrix:  
   [
  ( | 
 )   ( | 
 )
  ( | ( ))   ( | ( ))
]  0
  
  
1  
in which case (   ) is an SSE for    
  
    
; instead, if    
  
    
, behavioral rule 
   is not a social norm and is not followed by population   (by remark 1 above). 
 
Proof of Corollary 2. Given an end-node  ̂   , a Rawlsian social welfare function is 
defined as  (  ( ̂)   ( ̂))     
   
 *  ( ̂)   ( ̂)+; such a function has to be 
evaluated at each of the three end-nodes of the game tree, i.e.: 
 .  ( ( ))   ( ( ))/     
   
 *   +   ;  .  ( ( ))   ( ( ))/  
   
   
 *     +   ;  .  ( ( ))   ( ( ))/     
   
 *     +    . It follows that 
here the set of maximizers of  is singleton: so, at the initial node the behavioral rule 
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   dictates only the strategy profile   (  )  *(   )+; then, the norm-conjecture 
induced by   , for      , can be represented by the following matrix:  
   [
  ( | 
 )   ( | 
 )
  ( | ( ))   ( | ( ))
]  0
  
  
1  
The rest of the proof is trivial. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that   (  ) contains the following dictated strategy 
profiles:   (  )  *(   ) (   )+. Hence, the norm-conjecture induced by   , for 
     , can be represented by the following matrix:  
   [
  ( | 
 )   ( | 
 )
  ( | ( ))   ( | ( ))
]  [
  
 ̂    ̂
]  
where  ̂  *   +; that is, if  ̂    then strategy profile (   ) is implemented, whereas 
if  ̂    then (   ) is implemented. Thus Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s 
(expected) material payoff at    equals E      ,  | 
 -     ̂     (   ̂). 
Further, if Player 1 chose action  , then her expectation of Player 2’s potential 
disappointment at ( |  ) would equal E      ,  | 
 -    ( ( ))     ̂  
   (   ̂)             ̂; in turn, this implies that Player 1’s utility at 
( |  ) would equal   
 ( ( )         )    ( ( ))    0  .E      ,  | 
 -  
  ( ( ))/1      (           ̂). On the other hand, Player 1’s expected 
utility (=expected payoff) at  ( ) is given by E    ,  | ( )-     ̂    
(   ̂)     ̂: it follows that Player 1’s conformist preferences against   can be 
expressed as   
 ( ( )         )  E    ,  | ( )-      (        
   ̂)     ̂, which implies    
     ̂
           ̂
 {
   
    
      
    ̂   
   
 
       
    ̂   
, where 
the first case is always satisfied because    . Given that, if Player 1 does choose 
action  , then two scenarios are possible. (a) If Player 2 believes that Player 1 chose 
  because she believed that  ̂   , then Player 2’s expectation of Player 1’s potential 
disappointment at ( | ( )) would equal E    ,  | ( )-    ( ( ))       
    ; in turn, this implies that Player 2’s utility at ( | ( ))  would equal 
  
 ( ( )      )    ( ( ))    0  .E    ,  | ( )-    ( ( ))/1      
  (    ), whereas Player 2’s utility (=payoff) at ( | ( )) is simply given by 
  
 ( ( )      )    ( ( ))    . So, in this case Player 2’s conformist preferences 
against   can be expressed as   
 ( ( )      )    
 ( ( )      )      
  (    )        
  
    
: it follows that for  ̂   , (   ) is an SSE for 
   
  
    
. (b) The second scenario entails the following reasoning. If Player 2 
believes – in a self-serving way – that Player 1 chose   (even though she believed that 
 ̂   ) because    is large enough, then Player 2’s expectation of Player 1’s potential 
disappointment at ( | ( )) would be null as  ̂    in the expression 
E    ,  | ( )-    ( ( ))     ̂   ; in turn, this implies that Player 2’s utility 
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at ( | ( )) would simply correspond to her material payoff because there would be 
no deviation from   , hence no psychological loss (i.e.:   
 ( ( )      )  
  ( ( ))     ). So, in this case Player 2’s conformist preferences can be 
expressed as   
 ( ( )      )    
 ( ( )      )        , which is always 
satisfied: it follows that for  ̂   , (   ) is an SSE for    
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Proof of Proposition 6. Note that   (  ) contains a unique strategy profile (  
     
 ) 
where every player’s contribution equals   
   . Hence, the norm-conjecture 
induced by   , for      , is such that   (    )    for      . Thus Player  ’s 
expectation of Player  ’s (expected) material payoff at    equals E      [  | 
 ]  
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  (   )
 
   0  (   ) .
  
 
/1  
  
  (   )
 
   .
    (   )
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 ( (  
     
 )         )    ( (  
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